Alliances of Instrumental Advantage: Supporting Women’s Agency in Civil Society Organisations in Indonesia by Sherlock, Stephen
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 147–156
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i4.3347
Article
Alliances of Instrumental Advantage: Supporting Women’s Agency in Civil
Society Organisations in Indonesia
Stephen Sherlock
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Canberra, ACT 2612, Australia;
E-Mail: stephen.m.sherlock@gmail.com
Submitted: 14 June 2020 | Accepted: 7 September 2020 | Published: 25 November 2020
Abstract
This article examines how Indonesian civil society organisations (CSOs) working for women’s empowerment and gen-
der equality have worked together with members of parliament (MPs) to support processes of developmental change.
Examples are taken from initiatives supported byMAMPU, an Australian government funded project that promotes gender
equality and women’s empowerment in Indonesia, describing ways in which gender-focused organisations have engaged
with, and had an impact upon, the actions of political leaders in parliament. The article focuses on interaction between
institutions and the agency exercised by individuals within institutions. MPs act within a structure of institutional and
political incentives, but they also have the power to make choices about how they respond to incentives. Moreover, the
leaders of outside actors such as CSOs can modify the structure of incentives by both applying pressure on MPs and pro-
viding opportunities for legislators to make different choices. One of MAMPU’s tools for targeting MPs has been political
economy analysis. Having correctly understood the pressures and incentives facing MPs, CSOs can target their actions to
bring about outcomes favourable to both sides in what the article calls ‘alliances of instrumental advantage.’ Organisations
supported byMAMPU achieved success where relationships were forged between the organisations and politicians based
on the identification of mutual advantage.
Keywords
civil society organisations; Indonesia; political change; political economy; women’s empowerment
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Leadership and Political Change in Asia-Pacific” edited by David Hudson (University of
Birmingham, UK), Nicolas Lemay-Hébert (Australian National University, Australia), Claire Mcloughlin (University of
Birmingham, UK) and Chris Roche (La Trobe University, Australia).
© 2020 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
This article examines how Indonesian civil society organ-
isations (CSOs) working for women’s empowerment and
gender equality have cooperated withmembers of parlia-
ment (MPs) to support developmental change. Examples
are taken from initiatives supported by the Australia–
Indonesia Partnership for Gender Equality and Women’s
Empowerment, known as MAMPU, describing ways in
which CSOs partnered with MAMPU have engaged with,
and had an impact upon, actions of political leaders in
national and regional parliaments. The article focuses
on interaction between institutions and the agency exer-
cised by individuals within institutions. MPs act within a
structure of institutional and political incentives, but they
also havepower tomake choices about how they respond
to those incentives. Moreover, leaders of outside actors
such as CSOs can modify the structure of incentives by
both applying pressure on MPs and providing opportuni-
ties for legislators to make different choices.
MAMPU arose out of a commitment by the
Australian government to cooperate with the Indonesian
government in reducing poverty. The objective was to
help provide a voice for poor women in the develop-
mental agenda to ensure that issues of importance to
women were not marginalised in anti-poverty programs
(MAMPU, 2019). MAMPU has been implemented in two
four-year phases since 2012, receiving funding from the
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Australian Government to a total of about A$108 mil-
lion. The article shows that one of MAMPU’s tools for
identifying and targeting MPs has been through politi-
cal economy analysis. In the experience of MAMPU and
its partners, having correctly understood the pressures
and incentives facing MPs through this analytical pro-
cess, CSOs can target their actions to bring about out-
comes favourable to both sides in what the article calls
‘alliances of instrumental advantage.’ Organisations sup-
ported byMAMPU achieved success where relationships
were forged between the organisations and politicians
based on the identification of mutual advantage.
Two examples of MAMPU-supported initiatives have
been selected. Firstly, intervention in the drafting of
laws and regulations on migrant workers, and sec-
ondly, facilitation of productive relations between MPs
and their constituents. The case studies illustrate how
MAMPU and its partners were able to deal with certain
challenges—in the first case to bring about changes to a
national law that affected the lives of many thousands
of Indonesian women (and men), and in the second
case to empower local-level women’s organisations to
exercise influence over their representatives. The ambi-
tions behind these actions were realistic and contextual
and should not been seen as a template or definitive
model that can be replicated by CSOs in all circumstances.
Rather the case studies illustrate what can be achieved
when both international donors and CSOs think andwork
politically to achieve developmental change.
2. MAMPU and Alliances of Instrumental Advantage
MAMPU has supported a range of partners to empower
low-income women to make use of their political rights,
to influence government policies and to demand bet-
ter services from national and local state institutions.
MAMPU has used various approaches to advance these
objectives, but an underlying strategy has been to
encourage engagement between groups of low-income
women, MAMPU’s partner organisations, and decision-
making leaders in both executive government and par-
liaments. The strategy has been to facilitate engage-
mentwith parliamentary representatives as key decision-
makers about matters that affect women’s lives, through
parliament’s roles of passing legislation, deciding on
budget allocations, scrutinising executive government
actions, and representing the interests of constituents.
MAMPU’s methodology for parliamentary engage-
ment has been to enmesh the interests of partner organ-
isations with those of the MPs involved in decisions
related to a wide range of issues affecting women. These
have included women’s access to social protection pro-
grams, improved working conditions, women’s health
and nutrition, reducing violence against women and the
rights of migrant workers. The approach has exploited
opportunities to identify and focus on common mate-
rial and political interests of the two sides, especially
by using entry points created by incentives influenc-
ing the behaviour of MPs. In doing so, this can cre-
ate the alliances of instrumental advantage between
non-state actors and parliamentary leaders mentioned
above. They are alliances because they enmesh the inter-
ests of forces inside and outside parliament, but they are
instrumental in the sense that they are tactical arrange-
ments to encourage reform on specific issues without
necessarily having to involve ongoing organisational or
ideological agreement.
This approach exemplifies the strategy articulated
by Fox (2015) as a ‘sandwich strategy’ which supports
“coordinated coalitions among pro-accountability actors
embedded in both state and society” (Fox, 2015, p. 356).
In his metanalysis of social accountability initiatives, Fox
describes this as a “scenario of mutual empowerment”
where “openings from above led by reform champi-
ons…meet collective action from below” (2015, p. 356).
In the MAMPU-based examples described in this arti-
cle, reforming stakeholders within institutions were sup-
ported by outside actors and, in return, they delivered
important outcomes to what Fox calls “their societal
counterparts” (2015, p. 356). In one caseMPs supported
a single legislative change that was central to the objec-
tives of a CSO and, in the other, MPs developed new par-
liamentary practices that opened opportunities for citi-
zens’ input.
2.1. Indonesian Civil Society and MAMPU
The decision to initiate a program to strengthen the
voice of poor women in Indonesia’s poverty alleviation
efforts took place in the context of the evolution of
CSOs andwomen’s collective action in post-authoritarian
Indonesia and of donor efforts to support civil soci-
ety. During the years of President Suharto, community
groups fell under state control and were required to con-
duct activities under the umbrella of government pro-
grams. Thus,women’s collective action at the community
level virtually disappeared, except for religious groups
and the state sponsored Pembinaan Kesejahteraan
Keluarga (Family Welfare Guidance). The stifling of more
feminist and development focused action has required
progressive regeneration since the fall of the Suharto
regime in 1998, and external partners, including interna-
tional donors, have played a role.
Yet even under authoritarian rule, civil society did
provide one of the few spaces for political action rela-
tively free from state control—at least at the national
level (Aspinall, 2005). Therefore independent CSO activ-
ity was able to blossom after 1998 and has “generally
been credited with a critical role in turning the country
into a functioning democracy” (Mietzner, 2012, p. 217),
despite the continuing influence of old elites (Hadiz,
2010; Robison & Hadiz, 2005). Mietzner has proposed
that Indonesia’s democracy is “an arena of contesta-
tion” between entrenched elites and a range of reform-
ers and that the elites do not always prevail (Mietzner,
2013c, p. 29). Similarly, Lay (2017, p. 2) has argued that
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‘a new democratic space’ has emerged and, while con-
tested by many actors, this space has provided oppor-
tunities for CSOs to assert their agendas in parliament
and other locations. It is in these arenas of contestation
that CSOs continue to exercise influence over decisions
about policies, laws and practices by state institutions
and powerbrokers. And such arenas have been the site
of MAMPU-supported actions by civil society.
But the picture still remains mixed. Perdana (2015)
documented many of the democratic reform achieve-
ments of CSOs after 1998 but highlighted that civil
society as a whole has been weakened by internal
fragmentation and by continuing patronage-based pol-
itics. Reflecting such concerns, recent years have seen
a tone of pessimism enter debate about Indonesian
democracy and the power of civil society (Mietzner,
2020; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019). Nevertheless, CSOs
remain active and considerable advances have been
made in the creation of spaces for collective action
amongst previously marginalised groups such as women
(Migunani, 2017). This is especially so at the regional
level, where women had previously been excluded from
public debate, butwhere possibilitieswere opened up by
reforms that devolvedmany areas of government author-
ity to the districts from 2001.
MAMPU engages with women’s and gender equal-
ity focused CSOs from the angle of building alliances to
ensure that voices of poor women are on the agenda of
poverty alleviation.MAMPUwas not specifically designed
for reform of democratic structures but rather with the
aim of empowering a marginalised group to participate
in processes of decision-making available in a democ-
racy. As such, it is an inherently political undertaking
because it requires CSOs and the groups theyworkwith to
enter the arenas of political contestation described above.
But MAMPU does not engage directly with state insti-
tutions, nor is it simply a CSO-strengthening exercise—
MAMPU attempts to work at the point of interaction
between the state and its citizens by supporting Fox’s
“pro-accountability stakeholders” and their “scenarios of
mutual empowerment” (Fox, 2015, p. 356).
2.2. Role of Political Economy Analysis
Since MAMPU’s approach is deeply political, it requires
a keen understanding of the written and unwritten rules
of politics. The role of political economy analysis in the
MAMPUmethodology is to dissect the roles and relation-
ships shaping the behaviour of parliamentary represen-
tatives in order to understand how the world appears
from their perspective and thus how theymight, ormight
not, respond to particular approaches from non-state
actors. The analysis of the structure of incentives facing
MPs provides a conceptual tool which, when applied to
a specific issue and specific set of MPs, provides a guide
for action.
As suggested above, political economy analysis starts
from the proposition that political systems give rise to an
array of incentives that influence the behaviour of actors
within the system. Political actors in any institutional
frameworkwill use incentives created by that framework
to maximise advantage for themselves. And powerful
actors usually have a good understanding of how to gain
advantage because, firstly, they benefit frommentorship
and direction from their leaders and, secondly, because
they develop their own personal experience and exper-
tise from working within the system. Outsiders, how-
ever, benefit from neither of these advantages and may
have little knowledge of formal mechanisms and limited
grasp of informal practices and unspoken rules followed
by insiders. For actors such as CSOs, an added impedi-
ment can be distaste for what they see as the ‘dirty game’
of politics and a sense that becoming adept in politi-
cal manoeuvring might somehow sully their character.
But thinking and acting politically is critical to the success
of CSOs because not knowing the written and unwritten
rules of the game, or deliberately shrinking from gain-
ing such knowledge, places them at a great disadvantage.
Understanding the incentives influencing the behaviour
of insiders is a central component in empowerment of
outside actors.
Political economy analysis can therefore be used as
a tool by less powerful political actors to create alliances
with insiders within state institutions and thereby influ-
ence insiders’ decision-making. Such analysis can pro-
vide insights into pressures that influence the actions
of insiders and support the development of strategies
that are most likely to illicit positive responses to ideas
and proposals from outsider organisations. The MAMPU
methodology uses analysis of the institutional and stake-
holder variables of the political economy of Indonesia’s
parliaments and how they affect the behaviour of MPs.
The focus is onMPs as individual actors because, as in any
institution, it is the behaviour of people that occupy posi-
tions in parliament that determine its character. A purely
institution-focused approach tells us something about
what the rules are, but sheds less light on the reasons
actors within an institution behave the way they do.
We need to know not only what institutional actors do,
but why they do it.
The political economy approach has a long pedi-
gree is social science, but it has been taken up more
widely in international development circles in recent
years. The most notable examples are frameworks for-
mulated by the World Bank (Fritz, Kaiser, & Levy, 2009)
and the Drivers of Change approach developed by the
UKDepartment of International Development (Warrener,
2004). MAMPU’s use of political economy analysis has
developed in the context of debates about the practical
utility of such analysis. Hout takes the view that while
donors are “concerned about the political context in
which they operate, they feel they should not themselves
be concerned with politics in their partner countries”
(Hout, 2012, p. 407), emphasis in original). Being foreign
development agencies, Hout contends that they “experi-
ence an almost insurmountable difficulty” (2012, p. 407)
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in integrating their analysis into programs because of the
risk of political meddling in a sovereign country. This has
created a tendency for donors to take the politicallymore
tenable approach of concentrating on technical matters
because they are not in a position to openly confront
entrenched interests. But while MAMPU is not designed
to encourage head-on engagements with existing power
elites, it is still a political endeavour. As outlined above,
it provides support for bringing together reforming ele-
ments within society and within decision-making institu-
tions in order to create coalitions with potential to bring
about change.
MAMPU’s political economy analysis concentrates
on the dynamic interaction between institutional vari-
ables such as legislation, rules and organisations and
actor/stakeholder level variables such as societal actors,
political leaders, interest groups and individual actors
(Warrener, 2004, p. 8). In the arena of parliamentary
engagement, the focus is on how institutional incen-
tives inside and outside parliament interact with individ-
ual parliamentary actors. In analysing the interaction, it
reveals that MPs are not merely passive reflections of
incentives they confront, but actively respond to them to
achieve personal and collective objectives. At the same
time, MPs are also constrained by these influences and
can even be forced to act in ways that they would pre-
fer not to, and which may even go against their own per-
sonal values. But it should always be remembered that
the way individual actors choose to respond to the pres-
sures of their political environment will vary in degree
and kind. For example, all MPs need to keep potential
financial supporters friendly to them, but some will try
to balance donors’ influence against the best interest of
their constituents, while others may subordinate them-
selves to wealthy donors or even corruptly collude for
personal gain.
I am not suggesting that all MAMPU initiatives have
been preceded by formal political economy analysis,
but rather that the program has learnt through prac-
tice that the best outcomes were achieved when they
implicitly or explicitly built on an intersection of inter-
ests between the two sides. Recognition of the efficacy
of this approach has motivated MAMPU’s efforts to inte-
grate the approach more explicitly into programming.
MAMPU therefore engaged the author of this article to,
firstly, conduct a political economy analysis of incentives
that influence the behaviour of MPs and, secondly, to
review previous efforts in parliamentary engagement by
MAMPU and its partners. The review tracked the evolu-
tion of MAMPU’s engagement and determined that the
most effective examples of engagement were politically
informed and were responsive to changing political con-
text. The reviewdrew lessons to be passed on toMAMPU
partners in the form of advice and guidelines for their
future activities. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised
that in the two examples to be discussed below, the
organisations supported by MAMPU conducted studies
of the various stakeholders involved that were very sim-
ilar to political economy analyses and which had similar
effect. In one case, the organisation carried out “actor
mapping” (Arus & Ghofur, 2015, pp. 12–15) based on
the essential principles of political economy analysis and,
in the other, the organisation developed guidelines for
participants that included elements of the methodology
(Yayasan BaKTI, 2019).
2.3. What Incentives Influence the Actions of Indonesian
Member of Parliament?
This section analyses the structure of incentives that
influence the behaviour of IndonesianMPs anddescribes
the relationships from which the incentives emanate.
It is important to reiterate from the outset that the rela-
tionship between incentives and behaviour is not simply
deterministic—legislators have agency and they make
their own decisions about how to act. But every day
of their political lives they are forced to react in some
way to pressures bearing upon them. And understand-
ing these pressures helps to make sense of patterns in
politicians’ behaviour and why certain approaches from
the outside are likely to receive a positive response and
others are not.
Indonesia has a presidential system where the sepa-
ration of powers between the executive and legislative
branches of government endows parliament with exten-
sive political authority. There are parliaments at both
the national level and regional levels, and both routinely
use their independent popular mandate to play a role in
drafting and passing laws, including state budgets, and
have potentially formidable powers to hold the execu-
tive to account (Sherlock, 2007). Members of these par-
liaments play different roles as election candidates, polit-
ical fundraisers, party members, constituent representa-
tives, members of parliamentary committees and part-
ners/protagonists of executive government. The network
of relationships is illustrated in Figure 1.
2.3.1. MPs as Election Candidates
The cost of campaigning has escalated dramatically dur-
ing the last several Indonesian elections, a trend that
most observers see as a result of the ‘open list’ electoral
system which permits voters to vote for either individual
candidates or a party. The system has created perverse
incentives for candidates and entrenched what is locally
known as ‘money politics,’ such as vote-buying and pork-
barrelling. Recent in-depth research studies throughout
Indonesia, observed that the system is “widely blamed
by political candidates and voters alike for increasing
pressures for patronage” (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016,
p. 5). One former MP observed that elections have
become more “capital intensive” and without significant
financial backing it is “not realistic to run” (personal
communication, 2018). Campaigns increasingly appear
to be like auctions where candidates try to prove they
can bring voters higher material benefits. One candidate
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Figure 1. Relationships in MPs structure of incentives.
complained that it is “a real struggle to get people to vote
for you on the basis of ideas, rather than…gifts of money
or goods” (Aspinall & Sukmajati, 2016, p. 63). The incen-
tive is to offer handouts rather than to advocate policy or
ideals. The challenge for all CSOs and other outsiders is to
find ways of influencing public attitudes about themean-
ing of elections. I have frequently interviewed women
candidates who have expressed frustration at the prob-
lem of finding a supportive community environment in
which to put forward ideas and proposals about issues
affecting women.
2.3.2. MPs as Fundraisers
In such circumstances, politicians have to be fundrais-
ers. Patronage and clientelism have been longstand-
ing features of Indonesian society and politics, but
modern, urbanising, commercialised and media-based
cultures have entrenched new forms of clientelism
(Magaloni, 2014), rather than eliminating them as once
was expected (Aspinall, 2013; Brun & Diamond, 2014).
Political costs do not end after election day because an
MP must maintain his/her profile and popularity after
winning an election. A clientelist political culture creates
expectations that parliamentary patrons will personally
provide benefits to a community. Brun and Diamond
(2014, p. 257) emphasise that in many developing coun-
tries “politicians need to mobilise votes through the dis-
tribution of particularist benefits or clientelistic promises
rather promises of public goods.” MPs are locked into
clientelist relationships if they want to be re-elected.
There is thus a strong incentive for politicians to
seek out wealthy donors and to enter into relation-
ships involving influence-buying, rent-seeking and cor-
ruption. For example, collusive arrangements develop
where companies win contracts as a result of their con-
nections with MPs. The ever-increasing cost of politics
has meant that elected positions are increasingly being
filled by businesspeople or individuals supported by
them (Mietzner, 2007). This generates a self-reinforcing
nexus between MPs who are attracted to rent-seeking
behaviour as amethod of staying in office and thosewho
are attracted to public office because of opportunities
for enrichment. For women’s organisations, who have no
financial resources to offer, the task is to find other forms
of support for sympathetic representatives and to thus
increase the possibility that suchMPs can sustain a viable
career in public life without falling into the grip of trans-
actional politics.
2.3.3. MPs as Party Members
Indonesian parliamentarians’ role as party representa-
tives creates a particular set of incentives and obliga-
tions. Firstly, legislation obliges candidates to be nom-
inated by a party, and a high-ranking position on the
party ticket is a crucial advantage. And since Indonesia’s
parties tend to be dominated by small cliques of lead-
ers, MPs are obliged to stay close to those leaders and
win favour with them. Good party relationships come at
a cost—parties demand substantial payments for a top
position on the party ticket and expect ongoing contri-
butions (Mietzner, 2013a, 2013b). The most influential
MPs are those with deep pockets and connections with
influential local and national families. One corollary of the
transactional nature of relations between MPs and their
parties is that central party machines rarely exercise disci-
pline over theirmemberswhen it comes to policymatters.
The parties are weak on policy development (Mietzner,
2013b) and, while they expect MPs to defend the mate-
rial interests of the party in patronage-based politics,
they rarely intervene in policy and legislative debates
unless the direct personal interests of party leaders are at
stake. I have shown elsewhere (Sherlock, 2012) that the
policy-making function usually ascribed to political par-
ties in political science literature has, in Indonesia, largely
been subsumed by the parliamentary committee system.
Policy proposals are mostly the product of initiative by
small numbers of committee members, usually with little
reference to an official party stance (Sherlock, 2009).
Paradoxically, this weakness in parties provides open-
ings for CSOs to build bridges with parliamentary figures
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seeking practical support to intervene as issues emerge
onto the political stage. MPs with ambitions to enhance
their profile by developing expertise and connections in
a particular policy area need to seek outside assistance
because they are unlikely to find backingwithin the party
machine. Thus, openings for CSOs frequently arise dur-
ing the course of parliamentary deliberations on legis-
lation, but CSOs must be well-informed about potential
partners and well-attuned to the ebb and flow of polit-
ical life in order to exploit the advantage. A key aspect
of that process is to realise that prominent players rarely
act under party direction but are mostly driven by indi-
vidual ambition and internal political dynamics within
their committee.
2.3.4. MPs as Parliamentary Committee Members
Because of the extensive power of the legislature in
Indonesia’s presidential system, parliamentary commit-
tees are key centres of decision-making. Therefore, one
of the most powerful incentives for an MP is to be active
in committee roles in order to exercise influence and
build networks of power and patronage. In particular,
leadership positions such as committee chair or deputy
chair are highly sought after. For members with ambi-
tions to become leading national or regional political fig-
ures, prominent committee roles can be a steppingstone
to power, including as a powerbroker inside their party.
This makes committees involving large government bud-
gets, such as education or infrastructure, attractive for
rent-seeking opportunities. But othermore policy-driven
committees, such as foreign or legal affairs, provide
openings forMPs building a reputation for strategic think-
ing. In regional parliaments, committees are responsible
for overseeing budget allocations for the provision of
services in areas such as community health, education,
local infrastructure and issues about the quality of ser-
vice delivery. The importance of the committee system
in parliamentary decision-making makes it a key target
forwomen’s organisations. But, once again, outside inter-
ventions must be properly timed and carefully calibrated
to the needs of inside actors who may be willing to coop-
erate. Issues come and go, and the attention span of par-
liamentary committee members is short.
2.3.5. MPs as Partners or Protagonists of Executive
Government
MPs have strong incentives to build a reputation in their
dealings with executive government and to maintain a
network of connections with ministers and senior offi-
cials. This can be achieved by being seen as a coop-
erative partner who is known for his/her policy exper-
tise or by building a profile as a protagonist of govern-
ment who, for example, asks difficult questions during
committee investigations. Having respect in government
circles enables MPs to obtain information and to facili-
tate both formal and informal meetings connected with
their committee or party work. Stand-offs and other
interactions between legislative and executive govern-
ment actors have repeatedly opened up opportunities
for CSOs to exercise influence by cooperating with strate-
gically identified MPs. An example was the case dis-
cussed below where Migrant CARE provided data, argu-
ments and drafting assistance to MPs who were arguing
their casewith executive government agencies about leg-
islation on migrant workers.
2.3.6. MPs as Constituency Representatives
Finally, of course, MPs are elected as representatives of a
particular constituency. This can be themost difficult role
because incentives to be a good constituency represen-
tative are in competition with other pressures. As men-
tioned, there are strong pressures to win elections and
stay in office through embedding oneself in the culture
and practices of transactional politics. The relativelyweak
capacity of the Indonesian state to deliver policy and/or
programmatically based public goods creates pressures
on legislators to be seen as using their personal influence
to win special benefits for individuals and narrowly tar-
geted groups (Keefer, 2007). And citizens’ approaches to
parliamentarians for direct assistance are highly rational
in an environment of weak government services. Indeed,
this can discourage MPs from engaging broadly with
their constituents because they want to avoid constant
demands for help. Nevertheless, as the case study of
the CSO BaKTI outlined below indicates, it is possible for
women’s organisations to facilitate a better quality of
interaction between MPs and their constituents and, in
doing so, to provide stronger incentives for political rep-
resentatives to go out into the community.
2.4. Case Studies
Let us now examine two cases of CSO engagement with
parliaments by MAMPU partner organisations which
exemplify the effectiveness of approacheswhich enmesh
the interests of outside organisations and parliamentary
actors. The cases are, firstly, the success of Migrant CARE
in influencing the content of legislation on Indonesian
migrant workers and, secondly, initiatives led by BaKTI
which have shown potential to develop more productive
relations between MPs and their constituents.
2.4.1. Migrant CARE
To take the first case, Migrant CARE is an advocacy and
support organisation whose goal is to argue for legisla-
tive and other protections for overseas Indonesian work-
ers and their families and to provide legal and other
assistance to ensure they understand “their rights as
workers and citizens” (Migrant CARE, 2016) and that
their time abroad is lived with dignity and respect.
The treatment of Indonesian migrant workers, including
bad working conditions, low pay, withholding of wages
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and physical and sexual abuse, has been a prominent
issue for many years. Humanitarian concerns and feel-
ings of national outrage were generated by horrific sto-
ries of individual cases and personal tragedies. MAMPU
partneredwithMigrant CARE because a large proportion
of Indonesian migrant workers are women and because
women workers are most vulnerable to exploitation and
abuse. For its part, Migrant CARE recognised that the
issue of migrant workers’ rights is highly gendered and
that bringing about change had to involve active support
from women workers.
Following the inauguration of a new national parlia-
ment in 2014, Migrant CARE began lobbying for amend-
ments to legislation on overseas workers. Crucially, the
organisation developed a good relationship with the
chair of the committee responsible for the bill, who
was supportive of legislative reform. They also cultivated
links with other committee members and their staff,
leading party figures and specialist staff inside parlia-
ment, and worked together on drafting new legislation.
Interaction with parliament took many forms, includ-
ing formal meetings and drafting sessions, appearances
before parliamentary committees, public events, media
conferences, and informal meetings with individual MPs
in cafes, homes and offices. Migrant CARE was closely
associated with every stage of drafting and deliberations
on the legislation and their efforts were rewarded with
the passage of a law in 2017 that incorporated most of
the proposals they had put forward.
Migrant CARE’s input was highly regarded by lead-
ing committee members because it provided extensive
data about the issue and practical proposals for key prob-
lems, such as proposedwording for key clauses of the bill.
In particular, Migrant CARE’s ability to bring women who
had experienced abuse as migrant workers to appear in
person and tell their stories to parliamentary meetings
was invaluable in breaking down resistance to reform.
This was an example of what one MP said a committee
valued from CSOs: “Something we canworkwith,” rather
than aggressive hectoring and grandstanding (personal
communication, September 2018). In the words of the
committee chair:
If you hold a demo, it’s just a demo, away to say some-
thing in public. But if a small number comes tome and
we have a discussion, there can be some result. There
can be mutual benefit for you and me. (Personal com-
munication, May 2018)
Migrant CARE was able to make well-timed and targeted
interventions at specific stages of deliberations because
the organisationwas closely attuned to the politics of the
process—for example, suggesting compromise solutions
when the committee was deadlocked. This was in con-
trast to what another MP identified as some CSOs’ ten-
dency to simply repeat a standard set of arguments and
to show themselves unfamiliar with both the technicali-
ties and the politics of deliberations (personal communi-
cation, September 2018). In return, the view of the com-
mittee chair was that civil society had “got most of what
they wanted” in the final version of the legislation (per-
sonal communication, September 2018).
Migrant CARE’s work on this legislation could have
remained a one-off achievement at the national level,
but MAMPU worked with the organisation to encour-
age it to extend its methodology to Indonesia’s regions,
with the aim of influencing the passage of regional leg-
islation in migrant-sending provinces. For example in
early 2015, the organisation cooperated with a multi-
stakeholder network in the provinces of Nusa Tenggara
Timur and Nusa Tenggara Barat to develop draft legisla-
tion on migrant workers and their families in three dis-
tricts in the provinces. By the middle of the year, drafts
had been accepted by two of the three relevant district
legislatures and were eventually passed into law.
Migrant CARE’s initiatives succeeded where they
enmeshed with the interests of leading parliamentary
figures in pivotal positions—principally the chair of the
responsible committee and supportive members—and
helped them to respond to the array of incentives iden-
tified above. Firstly, the organisation’s backing for the
passage of good quality law supported MPs in their
roles as both committee members and party members
because it demonstrated the MPs’ effectiveness as lead-
ing political operators who could make an impact in
policy terms. Policy units in Indonesian political parties
are generally weak, thus throwing a burden of policy-
making responsibility onto parliamentary committees
that they are ill-equipped to handle (Sherlock, 2010,
2012). Partly throughMigrant CARE’s assistance, commit-
tee members could take credit for improving the pub-
lic standing of the parliament and their respective par-
ties, in the face of frequent criticism of the quantity
and quality of legislative output. This was an especially
potent outcome for the committee leadership because
stories of abuse of Indonesians overseas had struck an
angry response amongst the public. Secondly, passage
of the law enhanced the relationship between commit-
tee members and executive government powerbrokers,
because final agreement on many clauses of the legisla-
tion was only reached after hard negotiations with gov-
ernment agencies which had competing ideas about the
objectives of the law. Finally, for committee members
representing constituencies with migrant workers, pas-
sage of the law was extremely valuable for their efforts
to be seen as responding to constituents’ concerns.
2.4.2. BaKTI
In the second case, BaKTI—an umbrella organisation
with affiliate groups in eastern Indonesia—has led
efforts to facilitate better interaction between MPs and
women’s organisations in their communities and to over-
come problems created by perverse incentives discussed
above. The increasing centrality of ‘money politics’ can
crowd out incentives forMPs to engagewith constituents
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on local issues, policies and the provision of public goods.
If voters see their MPs only as providers of private ben-
efits, then politicians are discouraged from even visiting
their constituencies, except to promise things during elec-
tion time. In an attempt to address this problem, national
and regional parliaments created rules obliging (and
financing) MPs to visit their constituencies during parlia-
mentary recess periods, thus aiming to manufacture a
regulatory incentive to counteract incentives created by
the prevailing transactional political culture. The practical
result, however, was that MPs conducted formal ritualis-
tic meetings with hand-picked groups of well-connected
constituents who attended only to listen passively to
speeches and to pocket attendance money.
Itwas these realities that BaKTI observed as itworked
with MAMPU on a range of initiatives to promote par-
liamentary engagement by low-income women. Since
2012, the organisation has worked to turn conventional
top-down parliamentary recess events on their head by
a new approach called ‘participative recess.’ Under this
strategy, public discussions between constituents and
MPs take previously formalistic proceedings and turn
them into active participatory events. The objective is
to bring issues affecting women to the attention of local
MPs. There are few speeches and the bulk of the time
is devoted to organising participants into focus group
discussions based around issues of importance to them.
Each group formulates a set of issues to present to the
MP at a plenary discussion with the promise that theMP
will take up the issues in parliament and with relevant
government agencies.
The basis of the method is to build coalitions
between community-based women’s organisations and
MPswho are looking to break the stranglehold of transac-
tional politics. BaKTI organises what it calls ‘constituent
groups’ which are composed of local groups and indi-
viduals, but which receive formal endorsement through
a written agreement with MPs and local government.
These agreements ensure that the participative recess
activities receive support from the local parliamentary
secretariat in the form of logistics, venues and funding.
BaKTI makes particular effort to attract the widest pos-
sible membership and that group leaders are composed
of committed people and not co-opted by local power-
brokers. The number of MPs involved is still limited and
the methodology represents only a beginning, but it is a
model for what could be done if larger and more power-
ful players were to take up the idea.
The strength of the participative recess initiative lies
in its potential to tap into themost basic of incentives for
MPs—to promote their standing in communities and to
retain office in the next election. The constituent groups
and the meetings they sponsor help MPs to get a bet-
ter understanding of what voters are experiencing and
thinking. In the face of powerful incentives to relate to
voters only in terms of individual monetary benefit, the
initiative provides openings for MPs to engage with con-
stituents on a broad range of issues related to delivery of
government services and provision of public goods. This
is the reason the approachhas been takenup and actively
driven by some politicians themselves—they have repli-
cated the BaKTI methodology and independently built
connections beyond community groups around BaKTI.
Such MPs are pushing against the dominant stream of
transactional politics, but they show that there is a cohort
of politicians who genuinely want to build better con-
stituent relationships. It is MPs such as these that receive
encouragement and practical support from participative
recess activities. There is then potential for MPs with
respect in the community and increased prospects for re-
election to respond to one of the other main pressures
that bear upon them—to build their profile and reputa-
tion within their respective parties and, by doing so, to
positively influence the behaviour of their peers.
3. Conclusion: Thinking Politically
The formation of coalitions of instrumental advantage
supported by MAMPU is fundamentally a matter of
taking developmental reform beyond the merely tech-
nical into the realm of the political. Relatively power-
less groups in society such as low-income women can
advance their interests if they reach an understand-
ing of the written and unwritten rules that govern
decision-making institutions and the behaviour of politi-
cal leaders, and then learn how tomake political systems
operate in their favour. The experience of the MAMPU
program, and its partners such as Migrant CARE and
BaKTI, highlights a number of key conclusions.
Firstly, the structure of incentives that influenceMPs’
behaviour should not be read in a deterministic or static
fashion. In Indonesian circumstances, political economy
analysis could lead to the pessimistic conclusion that all
politicians are driven by forces of ‘money politics,’ to
the exclusion of what civil society might see as good
representation. But politicians also have agency—they
must respond to pressures around them, but they make
choices about how they respond. Moreover, outside
actors have agency as well and are participants inmaking
and remaking incentives that leaders confront. For exam-
ple, when Migrant CARE built supportive relationships
withMPs advocating legislative reform they changed the
structure of incentives in a positive way by increasing the
power of forces outside parliament working in favour of
change—had there been no civil society voice reform-
ers may well have capitulated to opponents of change.
Similarly, the participative recess methodology is a way
to mobilise community voices in support of MPs push-
ing tomake elected representativesmore accountable to
constituents. In doing so, they tilt the balance of incen-
tives away from a predominance of clientelist relation-
ships and strengthen incentives for representatives to be
responsive to the community.
Secondly, the nature of alliances of instrumental
advantage, as distinct from lasting compacts based on
a common political philosophy, is that they are fluid,
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tactical and contextual. The fact that MPs have agency
and make decisions about their behaviour also means
that their responses are also highly contextual and that
alliances with them are time-bound. MPs’ actions can
vary greatly according to the issue and its timing within
political and electoral cycles.
On some issues at certain times they may be willing
to work together with an outside organisation, but on
others they may not return its calls. Such an understand-
ing is important when CSOs try to identify possible entry
points into a parliament andwho are likely to be partners
or champions. There is a tendency for development advo-
cates to give the impression that therewill necessarily be
a recognisable bloc of dependable ‘reformers’ who can
be relied on for consistent support. While the existence
of such a bloc would clearly be ideal, the reality is that
political figures are likely to be inconsistent. Of course,
it is sensible to aim for lasting long-term alliances when
more principled agreement with a committed champion
is possible, but this cannot be expected in most cases.
Thus, it is generally more productive to follow Migrant
CARE’s practice andmap out whomay be willing to coop-
erate on the basis of mutual advantage on a particular
issue at a specific time.
The identification of champions in the Indonesian
context is especially difficult because, as discussed above,
parties generally lack a consistent policy orientation and
it is very difficult to predict what stance any particu-
lar MP might take on the basis of their party affiliation.
MPs with clear policy commitments must normally be
pinpointed individually because, without really intending
to, parties have given their MPs more individual agency
than would be expected in a parliament where mem-
bers are subject to strict policy discipline. For example,
Migrant CARE’s experience was that all parties debating
protection of migrant workers were united in condemn-
ing abuse of Indonesians overseas, but beyond a com-
mon reflexive nationalistic response, the stances of key
individuals in the responsible committee bore little rela-
tionship to their party background. Similarly, BaKTI has
identified no consistent correlation between MPs’ party
affiliations and their willingness to commit to the partici-
pative recess process and does not ever expect to do so
(personal communication, March 2018).
It can be useful to think in terms of three likely
cohorts amongst decision-makers on any issue: Obvious
advocates, clear opponents and the—probably largest—
grouping of ‘undecideds’ that can be swayed by develop-
ments. Parliaments and parliamentary committees will
usually have a cohort of the first kind who are known to
be motivated by a policy interest or a thought-out polit-
ical philosophy or ideology, but they will regrettably be
small in number and should not be the exclusive focus
of attention. The second cohort of committed oppo-
nents would clearly not be productive targets. The third
non-committal cohort, on the other hand, will usually
include individuals who could possibly be brought on
side because of particular interests related to the issue
at hand. Reformers can emerge from the most surpris-
ing places. But the number of close working partners is
likely to eventually centre on a core group of individuals,
after an initial period of surveying all possible openings.
All MPs should be targets for general publicity and argu-
mentation, but allies and champions will be few.
Of course, all potential relationships with parliamen-
tary cohorts need to be subject to a careful risk assess-
ment. There may be political risks in working with a par-
ticular individual or group ofMPs who have a wider polit-
ical or ideological agenda. There may be reputational
risks of being seen associating with someonewho is later
revealed to have been involved in unethical or illegal
behaviour. Political relationships are based on mutual
advantage, but while identifying potential partnerships,
it is also important to assess the risk of being exploited,
or of unintended consequences from being associated
with negative views or practices.
Finally, it is imperative that outsider organisations
bring something politically valuable to potential partners
in parliament. Thinking politicallymeans knowingwhat is
appropriate and what is timely. Migrant CARE provided
support to reform champions to help them win a politi-
cal battle and was rewarded with a greatly improved leg-
islative framework. BaKTI has provided a framework and
inspiration forMPswhowant amore genuine interaction
with their constituents and have consequently strength-
ened the voice of marginalised sections of the commu-
nity. The key lessons are that trust and engagement
take time and require politically-informed analysis to con-
nect with the right partners, and that strategic interven-
tions in concert with leading decision-makers can pay
dividends. The experience of MAMPU and its partners,
as exemplified by the two cases discussed in this arti-
cle, is that although parliamentary politics in Indonesia
has many problems, there are still openings for engage-
ment that can actually change the structure of incentives
facing MPs for the better. Realising that political rela-
tionships are inherently opportunistic and often imper-
manent provides a foundation for clear-headed thinking
about what is politically possible at any given time.
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